Liebowitz-Margolis - Winners, Losers & Microsoft Exzerpt
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Liebowitz S.J./Margolis, S.E. (2001): Winners, Losers & Microsoft. Competition and Antitrust in High Technology
“The very heart of our argument is that network effects do not ‘protect’ market participants from competition. The essence of the lock-in claim is that inferior products are ‘protected’ from superior newcomers. As we will see, however, there is neither convincing theory nor even minimal empirical support for the lock-in proposition.” (S. 14-15)
“These monopolies, we would argue, are efficient outcomes in network industries, where the network effect, or scale economy, is strong. It is not our argument that such monopolies would never arise, but rather that these monopolies would not be locked in. such industries are serial monopolies; one monopoly after another.” (S. 15)
“The strongest kind of path-dependence claim alleges the existence of inefficiencies that are remediable. [..] This is third-degree path dependence. The fact that the bad outcome was remediable is extremely important in economics. For something to be inefficient in an economic sense, there must be some better alternative. It is not enough to say, that something is not as good as we would like it to be. If that were all ‘inefficient’ meant, most everything would be inefficient all of the time. Furthermore, economic inefficiency means more than that there is some conceivable way that resources could be used, or could have been used, that would be better. For an inefficiency to be economically relevant, there must be some better alternative that is feasible in light of the information that we have at the time that we are making a decision. [Herv. i. O.]” (S. 54)
“Where we get started is a choice, not a random event.” (S. 63; aber es kann zufällig sein, vgl. die Interview-Stellen, wo von „Windows ist uns passiert“ die Rede ist.)
„Network markets consist of contests where firms compete to be the winner in setting a standard, founding a network, or establishing a technology. For the winner, there is no inherent restriction on market share. In such competitions, all of the rivals will use all of the tools that are available to them, but the standard or network technology that has the greatest potential will have the upper hand. Winners get to control virtually the entire market, until a new winner appears.” (S. 63-64; Wettbewerb worum? Auf welchen Gebieten? Lobbying z.B.? vgl. Varian et al. 2004, Was, wenn ein Standard “passiert”? Dass es natürliche Monopolmärkte gibt, ist ein Faktum, das entbehrt aber nicht der Frage, wie mit diesen Märkten umgehen? Was wenn verschiedene Marktformen möglich sind/wären?)
„When network effects were first introduced to the economics literature, they were widely called ‚network externalities’ But externality is used in economics to refer to something very specific. An economic externality occurs only when a decision maker does not confront, or bear, the full costs or benefits of his action.” (S. 68; Also immer? ;-)
“Note that we do not deny the possibility that there might be important economies of scale in production in many high-technology industries. We are merely pointing out that such a result is not inevitable, and requires empirical investigation before the truth can be determined” (S. 82)
“Computer software can be a standard, and it can be a standard that evolves. But it doesn’t have to be either.[..] A firm might, in fact, specifically avoid compatibility in order to preserver trade secrets or enforce product differentiation.” (S. 88)
“In fact, it is possible that observed winner-take-all outcomes are mostly driven by factors other than network effects. For example, if software markets were characterized by winner-take-all equilibria (which we will see later appears to be empirically true, we would have to determine whether network effect, large fixed costs, or some other factor (such as instant scalability) was responsible.” (S. 99; guter Punkt, stimmt sicher.)
“Because high technology changes so frequently, a firm that achieves monopoly with one technology will have difficulty holding on to its lead unless it is extremely resourceful. This further argues against a regulated-utilities approach in technology markets” (S. 99; bei Microsoft ist aber eben genau dieser Fall des “extremely resourceful” gegeben)
“The differences in tastes allow two standards to coexist in a stable equilibrium, even where net-value curves slope upward.” (S. 105; Beispiel für das Argumentieren mit stabilen Präferenzen, das gerade bei Erfahrungsgütern wie Software fehlleitend sein kann.)
„There are some straightforward implications here. First, even when there are economies of scale, network effects, or both, markets can allow more than one format to survive. The key to survival is to find a market niche and to produce a product that is as close to the preferences of that market segment as possible. [..] an example might be Apple’s continued existence, based in part on ist strength in publishing and entertainment markets that play to ist historic strengths in graphics.”“ (S. 106; wieder die Annahme stabiler Präferenzen, auch das “Vorhandensein” von Marktnischen, die aber oftmals gerade erst erschaffen werden müssen bzw. gerade bei Software sehr leicht imitiert werden können; Apple-Beispiel kann auch völlig anders interpretiert werden)
„It is important to note that the larger the difference in performance of the two formats, the easier it is for the superior format to overcome any initial lead of an inferior standard.“ (S. 109; Sicherheit im Software-Bereich? Konkurrenz von Entwicklungs- und Marktmodellen als “Performance“-Differenz?)
„There may be more of a problem if one standard is owned and the other is not. In this case, we do not have a level playing field on which the technologies can compete.” (S. 111; Open-Source vs. Microsoft)
“The whole concept of lock-in flies in the face of quality-will-win free-market assurances. If and when there is a third-degree lock-in, a product succeeds in spite of inferior quality. In such a market consumers purchase a product only because that is what everyone else is using, while in fact each consumer would have preferred to use a different product.” (S. 135; Was ist mit Fällen, wo es nicht um die Wahl zwischen einem guten und einem schlechten Produkt geht, sondern um die Möglichkeit so einer Wahl?)
„Of course, instant scalability is a two-edged sword. Such markets will, for all the same reasons, be ‘winner take-all, but only for a while.’ That is, they will exhibit serial monopoly. [Herv. i. O.]” (S. 137)
“But those who have already chosen a product must consider every change or upgrade in the light of whether the advantages of the new product outweigh the costs of switching.” (S. 140)
“While backward compatibility does have its advantages, it can be outweighed by other benefits. One such benefit is taking advantage of a paradigm change.” (S. 143; Open-Source-Software als “Paradigm Change”)
“The economist’s usual way to measure the quality of a product is to let the market decide.” (S. 150)
“Furthermore, it appears the OEM sales are not likely to influence our results too strongly.” (S. 153)
The Role of Prices, S. 154 f.: Vergleich von Lizenzkosten ist irreführend; Microsoft konnte gerade weil der Marktanteil so groß war geringere Preise anbieten, eben weil die Evonomies of Scale riesig, die Kosten der Produktion zusätzlicher Einheiten durch Selbstverstärkungseffekte gering sind >> die Annahme dass Netzwerkeffekte zu steigenden Preisen führen, muss für den Softwaremarkt stark hinterfragt werden, im Gegenteil, er kann gerade dazu führen, dass sich der Marketing-Aufwand (durch “viral marketing”) reduziert; Außerdem: geringere Bedeutung absoluter Preise bei stark wachsenden Märkten bei gleichzeitiger instant scalability; Bundling-Strategie/Suite-Strategie und ihre Auswirkung auf Preise)
„In short, with the change in operating system came a change in leadership.“ (S. 182)
“Microsoft Word ultimately came to dominate the Windows world for pretty much the same reasons that Excel succeeded: Microsoft Word was a superior product at a time when consumers were rethinking their adoptions and Microsoft engaged in better strategic marketing (office suites).” (S. 186; gleichzeitig wird aber der große Vorteil des Zusammenspiels zw. Windows und Office von Microsoft betont, dessen Wichtigkeit gerade mit der Verbreitung von Windows korreliert. Das war einer der wesentlichsten „Qualitätsmerkmale“ von Word/Excel; Gegenargument auf S. 195: Marktanteil bei Apple-PCs war noch früher noch höher)
„The transition from DOS to Windows presented a golden opportunity for ratcheting up market share in the word processor market, and Microsoft was positioned perfectly to take advantage of this opportunity.” (S. 191)
“Smoothness” der Marktveränderungen als “Widerlegung” des “Tipping”-Konstrukts, S. 192: Durch die Nutzungsdauern von Software von ca. 4-5 Jahren gestalten sich Veränderungen immer „smooth“ und selten abrupt.
„Market structuralists, following in the footsteps of Joe Bain, argue that high market share almost always leads to monopoly behavior. Critics of this theory, collectively known as the Chicago School, disagree. They argue that even if one firm dominates the market, in the absence of barriers to entry, potential competition will cause the market to behave competitively.” (S. 196; Chicage-Argument entspricht auch der Sichtweise Schumpeters, aber: Alleine durch (Lizenz-!!)Preisvergleiche kein Monopolverhalten zu entdecken und damit keine Nachteile für Konsumenten, ist verkürzt. Außerdem gibt es auf Grund hoher Fixkosten und Entwicklungsvorlaufzeiten enorme Markteintrittsbarrieren, zusätzlich zu Switching-Kosten. Monopolverhalten von Microsoft im Browser-Krieg, im Umgang mit Java/ActiveX, abseits des Lizenzkosten-Bereichs >> führen auch zu Monopol-Renditen; ein niedrigerer Lizenzpreis relativ zu MitbewerberInnen kann sogar zu höheren Netto-Switching-Kosten führen, die ja nur einmal anfallen und damit ein Hinweis auf monopolistisches Aufziehen von Markteintrittsbarrieren sein;)
„In other words, Microsoft did not act like a textbook monopolist (charging heigher prices) in the market where it appeared to have a structural monopoly.” (S. 196; das Problem ist in diesem Fall einerseits das “Textbook” und andererseits die völlig falsche Konzentration auf Lizenzpreise beim Vergleich von Softwarepreisen bzw. die selektive Nichtbeachtung von Bundlings-Strategien wie der Suite-Strategie)
„Our message is simple: Good products win.” (S. 235)
