Drahos/Braithwaite - Information Feudalism Exzerpt
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| * "Absolutely crucial to the persuasive power of this story was economic analysis. The mode of analysis became the message. Economic reports turned the intellectual property story from one of moral transgression into the loss of markets and profits." (p. 64) | * "Absolutely crucial to the persuasive power of this story was economic analysis. The mode of analysis became the message. Economic reports turned the intellectual property story from one of moral transgression into the loss of markets and profits." (p. 64) | ||
| * "The 1984 trade amendments had given legal backing to a bilateral process of ratcheting up standards of intellectual property protection in other countries. The process had a chance of success only because other countries wanted to get their hands on the vast US market. As long as these countries calculated that the cost of complying with US demands on intellectual property was outweighed by the benefits of access to the US market then the 301 process would bring positive results." (p. 89) | * "The 1984 trade amendments had given legal backing to a bilateral process of ratcheting up standards of intellectual property protection in other countries. The process had a chance of success only because other countries wanted to get their hands on the vast US market. As long as these countries calculated that the cost of complying with US demands on intellectual property was outweighed by the benefits of access to the US market then the 301 process would bring positive results." (p. 89) | ||
| - | * Linking intellectual property to trade had been the work of a few key individuals. Pfizer, led by Edmund Pratt, as we saw in Chapter 4, had played a central role in pushing the linkage between intellectual property and trade. Under Pratt's leadership the Adivsory Committee on Trade Negotiations (ACTN) had argued that the US government should develop an integrated multilateral and bilateral intellectual property strategy based on trade linkages. Jacques Gorlin, adviser to ACTN, headed Intellectual Property Committee, the key lobbying body on the industrial side of intellectual property. It had been the Motion Picture Association that "wrote" an amendment to the Caribbean Basin legislation of 1983 that died trade conessions to intellectual property. (...) The reworking of the US Trade Act in the 1980s to accomodate intellectual property was accompanied by the formation of two business organizations, the Intellectual Property Committee (IPC) and the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA). | + | * "Linking intellectual property to trade had been the work of a few key individuals. Pfizer, led by Edmund Pratt, as we saw in Chapter 4, had played a central role in pushing the linkage between intellectual property and trade. Under Pratt's leadership the Adivsory Committee on Trade Negotiations (ACTN) had argued that the US government should develop an integrated multilateral and bilateral intellectual property strategy based on trade linkages. Jacques Gorlin, adviser to ACTN, headed Intellectual Property Committee, the key lobbying body on the industrial side of intellectual property. It had been the Motion Picture Association that "wrote" an amendment to the Caribbean Basin legislation of 1983 that died trade conessions to intellectual property. (...) The reworking of the US Trade Act in the 1980s to accomodate intellectual property was accompanied by the formation of two business organizations, the Intellectual Property Committee (IPC) and the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA)." (p. 90-91; Anm.: Liste mit IIPA-Mitgliedsorganisationen auf S.91-92) |
| + | * "In commenting on the more limited success of the US trade union movement in linking labor standards to trade and the total failure of the environmental movement to secure a "green 301," one IIPA leader said: "The problem with the greens is they're not as united as we are." Many of the members of the IIPA had been around for some time. (...) the IIPA were not just interested in a copyright regime that secured export markets, but also one that helped to maintain the industrial pecking order within the world economy. Once the 301 system had been put in place, those who had lobbied for its creation became its biggest users. A 301 action could begin with the USTR or alternatively any "interested person" could file a petition asking the USTR to launch an investigation under 301. Petitions could also be filed to deny GSP benefits to a country. The IIPA became, as we shall see in the next section, an "interested person"." (p. 92-93) | ||
| + | * "Section 301 was much more about barking than biting. For any county, even one as powerful as the US, agression brings costs. (...) In the community of trade negotiators what really counts are deals that allow trade to happen, not decisions that disrupt trade relations." (p. 99) | ||
| + | * "The individual company members of the IIPA were also happy for the IIPA to be seen as the bully. Companies such as IBM with offices and markets in developing countries did not want to be too closely linked to the use of 301." (p. 100) | ||
| + | * "With both bilaterals and the GATT, the IIPA position was: "We'll ''not'' negotiate on standards of IP. We'll negotiate on ''time'' to meet them. Any watering down of IP standards and no deal, no GATT" (p. 101) | ||
| + | * "Most 301 actions would have been illegal under GATT." (p 105) | ||
| + | * "Here WIPO was able to render assistance. It was and is the wealthiest UN organization because of the fees it collects under its international registration services. In 1990, for example, it collected fees of 54,850,000 Swiss francs under the Patent Cooperation Treaty." (p. 111) | ||
| + | * "The US withdrew from UNESCO because developing countries were using it as a forum to push a program called the "New World Information Order." (p. 112) | ||
| + | * "In March 1986 they created the Intellectual Property Committee (IPC). The IPC was an ad hoc coalition of 13 major US corporations: Bristol-Myers, DuPont, FMC Corporation, General Electric, General Motors, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Monsanto, Pfizer, Rockwell International, and Warner Communications." (p-. 118) | ||
| + | * "The IPC realized early on that the Uruguay Round of negotiations on intellectual property would be a contest of principles. No trade negotiation over intellectual property could be conducted with negotiators having to wade through, let alone argue about, thousands of sections and cases on intellectual property law. The negotiating game would be about broad principle, principle that did not necessarily square with existing laws." (p. 124) | ||
| + | * "Ironically, the US semiconductor chip industry had achieved its preeminence based on a liberal licensing of patent rights, something that Bell Laboratories had been pushed into by the terms of the AT&T consent decree." (p. 125) | ||
| + | * "As one interviewee wryly remarked, the "world needs protection from Madonna, rather than for her." (p. 126) | ||
| + | * "Finally, the IPC did not just work on building inner circles of consensus. It also worked on the outer circle - developing countries. (...) It (TRIPS, Anm.) would not (...) be a condition of GATT membership. Once the code was in place, developing countries could be given incentives to join." (p. 129) | ||
| + | * "Copyright notices and registration requirements are useful because they alert third parties to the presence of a property right, help users to determine who are the owners of the copyright and provide clarity about what is and is not in the public domain." (p. 130) | ||
| + | * "The negotiations on TRIPS are often said to have begun properly in the second half of 1989 when a number of countries made proposals, or the first part of 1990 when five draft texts of an agreement were submitted to the negotiating group. A more skeptical view is that the negotiations were by then largely over. Developing countries had simply run out of alternatives and options." (p. 136) | ||
| + | * "The reality is that we do not spend a lot of time thinking about legal issues when we negotiate agreements in the GATT ... (T)he concerns that we have are with the commercial results of what a negotiated agreement is, rather than with the legal niceties of it." (Emory Simon, the then director for Intellectual Property at the Office of the USTR). (...) The basic rule for negotiators was to find very clear language to describe the deals favorable to them, while striving to set in ambiguous language those deals in which they had made concessions. The negotiations were a search for clarity and "constructive ambiguity" at the same time." (p. 139) | ||
| + | * "US negotiators were physically accompanied by US business representatives." (p. 141) | ||
| + | * "US lobbyists kept up the pressure on the issue of the transitional periods. Their problem, as one of them explained to us, was that the CEOs who had helped to make TRIPS a reality wanted to see some immediate return for their companies. Ten years is a long, long time in the lfe of a CEO." (p. 147) | ||
| + | |||
| == Backlinks == | == Backlinks == | ||
| [[Buchverzeichnis]] | [[Buchverzeichnis]] | ||
Version vom 13:15, 16. Jul 2011
- "Intellectual property rights put a price on information, thereby raising the cost of borrowing. (...) Most business, we argue, will be losers, not winners." (p. 2)
- "The grant of power that comes with intellectual property rights carries with it two great dangers. First, depending on the resource in question it may place the holder of the right, or a small group of holders, in a position of central command in a market. (...) The second and greater danger of intellectual property lies in the threat to liberty." (p. 3)
- On librarians confronted with copyright claims by publishers: "Interpreting copyright rules, especially on the complex issues raised by digital technologies, is hardly their field, so more often than not they comply." (p. 4)
- "probably less than 50 people were responsible for TRIPS." (p. 10)
- "The long-run performance of economies has much to do with efficiently defined property rights." (p. 13; Anm.: Zitat für Einstieg in Public Domain Debatte)
- "Efficiency in the case of intellectual property rights is generally thought to involve a balance between rules of appropriation and rules of diffusion. (...) Even more important though is the fact that a rights-based democratic culture allows for the formation of interest groups from business and civil society sectors that bargain over resources that matter to them." (p. 13)
- "Copyright, for example, is becoming an anti-innovation regime, used by established players like the music industry to suppress the threat of change that Napster-like innovations bring. (...) The truth is that current intellectual property regimes do a very poor job of channeling rewards (and therefore creating incentives) to creators. (...) The corporate owners of intellectual property depend heavily on the public sector and the public domain, a dependence that suggests that society should be thinking about weaker and not stronger intellectual property rights. (...) Another example of the same pervasive phenomenon of recycling public knowledge for private reward occurs in the educational sector where copyright owners uplift university-generated, publicly funded research into journals or databases and then charge universities and students for the use of them." (p. 15)
- "For the time being, many of the NGOs, businesses, individuals and professional organizations fighting for the preservation of the intellectual commons do so in isolation from each other." (p. 17)
- "There are really two important frontline strategies. First, corporate intellectual property owners lobby policy makers intensively, arguing that more public money should be put into dealing with high-technology crime, by which they mean the copying of their products. (...) A second and more recent strategy by corporate owners of intellecutal property is the attempt to link intellectual property piracy with organized crime, with crimes that the public are really scared of." (p. 27)
- "But intellectual property piracy, just like piracy on the high seas, is something that is hard to pin down legally." (p. 27)
- "Large numbers of people connected with the book trade went to jail. The statistics seem incredible to the modern eye, but during the 1750s 40 percent of those in the Bastille were there because of offenses related to the book trade." (p. 31)
- "The linguistic diversity of America meant that there was a market in the US for English, German and French books. (...) Victor Hugo became one of the key organizers of an authors' movement for international copyright protection." (p. 33)
- "In the corridors of power that matter to the global economy, the WTO, the International Monetary FUnd (IMF), Washington and Brussels bureaucrats participate in a trade "think speak" in which global monopoly privileges are entirely consistent with free trade and must be strengthened." (p. 37)
- "Corsslicensing, in other words, was really only a game for equals." (p. 45)
- "Attacking patent-based cartels was far harder for a competition authority, for now it had to face the argument that it was interfering in the use of private property." (p. 51)
- "Patent-sharing agreements did exactly the same things that good old-fashioned cartel agreements did. They divided up territories, set prices and controlled production." (p. 53)
- "On July 9 1982 an op-ed piece bearing the title "Stealing From the Mind" was published in the New York Times. Appearing under the name Barry MacTaggart, the then chairman and president of Pfizer International, its central charge was that US knowledge and inventions were being stolen." (p. 60)
- "Absolutely crucial to the persuasive power of this story was economic analysis. The mode of analysis became the message. Economic reports turned the intellectual property story from one of moral transgression into the loss of markets and profits." (p. 64)
- "The 1984 trade amendments had given legal backing to a bilateral process of ratcheting up standards of intellectual property protection in other countries. The process had a chance of success only because other countries wanted to get their hands on the vast US market. As long as these countries calculated that the cost of complying with US demands on intellectual property was outweighed by the benefits of access to the US market then the 301 process would bring positive results." (p. 89)
- "Linking intellectual property to trade had been the work of a few key individuals. Pfizer, led by Edmund Pratt, as we saw in Chapter 4, had played a central role in pushing the linkage between intellectual property and trade. Under Pratt's leadership the Adivsory Committee on Trade Negotiations (ACTN) had argued that the US government should develop an integrated multilateral and bilateral intellectual property strategy based on trade linkages. Jacques Gorlin, adviser to ACTN, headed Intellectual Property Committee, the key lobbying body on the industrial side of intellectual property. It had been the Motion Picture Association that "wrote" an amendment to the Caribbean Basin legislation of 1983 that died trade conessions to intellectual property. (...) The reworking of the US Trade Act in the 1980s to accomodate intellectual property was accompanied by the formation of two business organizations, the Intellectual Property Committee (IPC) and the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA)." (p. 90-91; Anm.: Liste mit IIPA-Mitgliedsorganisationen auf S.91-92)
- "In commenting on the more limited success of the US trade union movement in linking labor standards to trade and the total failure of the environmental movement to secure a "green 301," one IIPA leader said: "The problem with the greens is they're not as united as we are." Many of the members of the IIPA had been around for some time. (...) the IIPA were not just interested in a copyright regime that secured export markets, but also one that helped to maintain the industrial pecking order within the world economy. Once the 301 system had been put in place, those who had lobbied for its creation became its biggest users. A 301 action could begin with the USTR or alternatively any "interested person" could file a petition asking the USTR to launch an investigation under 301. Petitions could also be filed to deny GSP benefits to a country. The IIPA became, as we shall see in the next section, an "interested person"." (p. 92-93)
- "Section 301 was much more about barking than biting. For any county, even one as powerful as the US, agression brings costs. (...) In the community of trade negotiators what really counts are deals that allow trade to happen, not decisions that disrupt trade relations." (p. 99)
- "The individual company members of the IIPA were also happy for the IIPA to be seen as the bully. Companies such as IBM with offices and markets in developing countries did not want to be too closely linked to the use of 301." (p. 100)
- "With both bilaterals and the GATT, the IIPA position was: "We'll not negotiate on standards of IP. We'll negotiate on time to meet them. Any watering down of IP standards and no deal, no GATT" (p. 101)
- "Most 301 actions would have been illegal under GATT." (p 105)
- "Here WIPO was able to render assistance. It was and is the wealthiest UN organization because of the fees it collects under its international registration services. In 1990, for example, it collected fees of 54,850,000 Swiss francs under the Patent Cooperation Treaty." (p. 111)
- "The US withdrew from UNESCO because developing countries were using it as a forum to push a program called the "New World Information Order." (p. 112)
- "In March 1986 they created the Intellectual Property Committee (IPC). The IPC was an ad hoc coalition of 13 major US corporations: Bristol-Myers, DuPont, FMC Corporation, General Electric, General Motors, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Monsanto, Pfizer, Rockwell International, and Warner Communications." (p-. 118)
- "The IPC realized early on that the Uruguay Round of negotiations on intellectual property would be a contest of principles. No trade negotiation over intellectual property could be conducted with negotiators having to wade through, let alone argue about, thousands of sections and cases on intellectual property law. The negotiating game would be about broad principle, principle that did not necessarily square with existing laws." (p. 124)
- "Ironically, the US semiconductor chip industry had achieved its preeminence based on a liberal licensing of patent rights, something that Bell Laboratories had been pushed into by the terms of the AT&T consent decree." (p. 125)
- "As one interviewee wryly remarked, the "world needs protection from Madonna, rather than for her." (p. 126)
- "Finally, the IPC did not just work on building inner circles of consensus. It also worked on the outer circle - developing countries. (...) It (TRIPS, Anm.) would not (...) be a condition of GATT membership. Once the code was in place, developing countries could be given incentives to join." (p. 129)
- "Copyright notices and registration requirements are useful because they alert third parties to the presence of a property right, help users to determine who are the owners of the copyright and provide clarity about what is and is not in the public domain." (p. 130)
- "The negotiations on TRIPS are often said to have begun properly in the second half of 1989 when a number of countries made proposals, or the first part of 1990 when five draft texts of an agreement were submitted to the negotiating group. A more skeptical view is that the negotiations were by then largely over. Developing countries had simply run out of alternatives and options." (p. 136)
- "The reality is that we do not spend a lot of time thinking about legal issues when we negotiate agreements in the GATT ... (T)he concerns that we have are with the commercial results of what a negotiated agreement is, rather than with the legal niceties of it." (Emory Simon, the then director for Intellectual Property at the Office of the USTR). (...) The basic rule for negotiators was to find very clear language to describe the deals favorable to them, while striving to set in ambiguous language those deals in which they had made concessions. The negotiations were a search for clarity and "constructive ambiguity" at the same time." (p. 139)
- "US negotiators were physically accompanied by US business representatives." (p. 141)
- "US lobbyists kept up the pressure on the issue of the transitional periods. Their problem, as one of them explained to us, was that the CEOs who had helped to make TRIPS a reality wanted to see some immediate return for their companies. Ten years is a long, long time in the lfe of a CEO." (p. 147)
