Drahos/Braithwaite - Information Feudalism Exzerpt
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| Version vom 22:32, 14. Jul 2011 (bearbeiten) 91.66.163.2 (Diskussion) ← Zum vorherigen Versionsunterschied |
Version vom 12:50, 16. Jul 2011 (bearbeiten) 91.66.163.2 (Diskussion) Zum nächsten Versionsunterschied → |
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| * "Intellectual property rights put a price on information, thereby raising the cost of borrowing. (...) Most business, we argue, will be losers, not winners." (p. 2) | * "Intellectual property rights put a price on information, thereby raising the cost of borrowing. (...) Most business, we argue, will be losers, not winners." (p. 2) | ||
| * "The grant of power that comes with intellectual property rights carries with it two great dangers. First, depending on the resource in question it may place the holder of the right, or a small group of holders, in a position of central command in a market. (...) The second and greater danger of intellectual property lies in the threat to liberty." (p. 3) | * "The grant of power that comes with intellectual property rights carries with it two great dangers. First, depending on the resource in question it may place the holder of the right, or a small group of holders, in a position of central command in a market. (...) The second and greater danger of intellectual property lies in the threat to liberty." (p. 3) | ||
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| * "Copyright, for example, is becoming an anti-innovation regime, used by established players like the music industry to suppress the threat of change that Napster-like innovations bring. (...) The truth is that current intellectual property regimes do a very poor job of channeling rewards (and therefore creating incentives) to creators. (...) The corporate owners of intellectual property depend heavily on the public sector and the public domain, a dependence that suggests that society should be thinking about weaker and not stronger intellectual property rights. (...) Another example of the same pervasive phenomenon of recycling public knowledge for private reward occurs in the educational sector where copyright owners uplift university-generated, publicly funded research into journals or databases and then charge universities and students for the use of them." (p. 15) | * "Copyright, for example, is becoming an anti-innovation regime, used by established players like the music industry to suppress the threat of change that Napster-like innovations bring. (...) The truth is that current intellectual property regimes do a very poor job of channeling rewards (and therefore creating incentives) to creators. (...) The corporate owners of intellectual property depend heavily on the public sector and the public domain, a dependence that suggests that society should be thinking about weaker and not stronger intellectual property rights. (...) Another example of the same pervasive phenomenon of recycling public knowledge for private reward occurs in the educational sector where copyright owners uplift university-generated, publicly funded research into journals or databases and then charge universities and students for the use of them." (p. 15) | ||
| * "For the time being, many of the NGOs, businesses, individuals and professional organizations fighting for the preservation of the intellectual commons do so in isolation from each other." (p. 17) | * "For the time being, many of the NGOs, businesses, individuals and professional organizations fighting for the preservation of the intellectual commons do so in isolation from each other." (p. 17) | ||
| + | * "There are really two important frontline strategies. First, corporate intellectual property owners lobby policy makers intensively, arguing that more public money should be put into dealing with high-technology crime, by which they mean the copying of their products. (...) A second and more recent strategy by corporate owners of intellecutal property is the attempt to link intellectual property piracy with organized crime, with crimes that the public are really scared of." (p. 27) | ||
| + | * "But intellectual property piracy, just like piracy on the high seas, is something that is hard to pin down legally." (p. 27) | ||
| + | * "Large numbers of people connected with the book trade went to jail. The statistics seem incredible to the modern eye, but during the 1750s 40 percent of those in the Bastille were there because of offenses related to the book trade." (p. 31) | ||
| + | * "The linguistic diversity of America meant that there was a market in the US for English, German and French books. (...) Victor Hugo became one of the key organizers of an authors' movement for international copyright protection." (p. 33) | ||
| + | * "In the corridors of power that matter to the global economy, the WTO, the International Monetary FUnd (IMF), Washington and Brussels bureaucrats participate in a trade "think speak" in which global monopoly privileges are entirely consistent with free trade and must be strengthened." (p. 37) | ||
| + | * "Corsslicensing, in other words, was really only a game for equals." (p. 45) | ||
| + | * "Attacking patent-based cartels was far harder for a competition authority, for now it had to face the argument that it was interfering in the use of private property." (p. 51) | ||
| + | * "Patent-sharing agreements did exactly the same things that good old-fashioned cartel agreements did. They divided up territories, set prices and controlled production." (p. 53) | ||
| + | * "On July 9 1982 an op-ed piece bearing the title "Stealing From the Mind" was published in the New York Times. Appearing under the name Barry MacTaggart, the then chairman and president of Pfizer International, its central charge was that US knowledge and inventions were being stolen." (p. 60) | ||
| + | * "Absolutely crucial to the persuasive power of this story was economic analysis. The mode of analysis became the message. Economic reports turned the intellectual property story from one of moral transgression into the loss of markets and profits." (p. 64) | ||
| + | * "The 1984 trade amendments had given legal backing to a bilateral process of ratcheting up standards of intellectual property protection in other countries. The process had a chance of success only because other countries wanted to get their hands on the vast US market. As long as these countries calculated that the cost of complying with US demands on intellectual property was outweighed by the benefits of access to the US market then the 301 process would bring positive results." (p. 89) | ||
| + | * Linking intellectual property to trade had been the work of a few key individuals. Pfizer, led by Edmund Pratt, as we saw in Chapter 4, had played a central role in pushing the linkage between intellectual property and trade. Under Pratt's leadership the Adivsory Committee on Trade Negotiations (ACTN) had argued that the US government should develop an integrated multilateral and bilateral intellectual property strategy based on trade linkages. Jacques Gorlin, adviser to ACTN, headed Intellectual Property Committee, the key lobbying body on the industrial side of intellectual property. It had been the Motion Picture Association that "wrote" an amendment to the Caribbean Basin legislation of 1983 that died trade conessions to intellectual property. (...) The reworking of the US Trade Act in the 1980s to accomodate intellectual property was accompanied by the formation of two business organizations, the Intellectual Property Committee (IPC) and the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA). | ||
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| == Backlinks == | == Backlinks == | ||
| [[Buchverzeichnis]] | [[Buchverzeichnis]] | ||
Version vom 12:50, 16. Jul 2011
- "Intellectual property rights put a price on information, thereby raising the cost of borrowing. (...) Most business, we argue, will be losers, not winners." (p. 2)
- "The grant of power that comes with intellectual property rights carries with it two great dangers. First, depending on the resource in question it may place the holder of the right, or a small group of holders, in a position of central command in a market. (...) The second and greater danger of intellectual property lies in the threat to liberty." (p. 3)
- On librarians confronted with copyright claims by publishers: "Interpreting copyright rules, especially on the complex issues raised by digital technologies, is hardly their field, so more often than not they comply." (p. 4)
- "probably less than 50 people were responsible for TRIPS." (p. 10)
- "The long-run performance of economies has much to do with efficiently defined property rights." (p. 13; Anm.: Zitat für Einstieg in Public Domain Debatte)
- "Efficiency in the case of intellectual property rights is generally thought to involve a balance between rules of appropriation and rules of diffusion. (...) Even more important though is the fact that a rights-based democratic culture allows for the formation of interest groups from business and civil society sectors that bargain over resources that matter to them." (p. 13)
- "Copyright, for example, is becoming an anti-innovation regime, used by established players like the music industry to suppress the threat of change that Napster-like innovations bring. (...) The truth is that current intellectual property regimes do a very poor job of channeling rewards (and therefore creating incentives) to creators. (...) The corporate owners of intellectual property depend heavily on the public sector and the public domain, a dependence that suggests that society should be thinking about weaker and not stronger intellectual property rights. (...) Another example of the same pervasive phenomenon of recycling public knowledge for private reward occurs in the educational sector where copyright owners uplift university-generated, publicly funded research into journals or databases and then charge universities and students for the use of them." (p. 15)
- "For the time being, many of the NGOs, businesses, individuals and professional organizations fighting for the preservation of the intellectual commons do so in isolation from each other." (p. 17)
- "There are really two important frontline strategies. First, corporate intellectual property owners lobby policy makers intensively, arguing that more public money should be put into dealing with high-technology crime, by which they mean the copying of their products. (...) A second and more recent strategy by corporate owners of intellecutal property is the attempt to link intellectual property piracy with organized crime, with crimes that the public are really scared of." (p. 27)
- "But intellectual property piracy, just like piracy on the high seas, is something that is hard to pin down legally." (p. 27)
- "Large numbers of people connected with the book trade went to jail. The statistics seem incredible to the modern eye, but during the 1750s 40 percent of those in the Bastille were there because of offenses related to the book trade." (p. 31)
- "The linguistic diversity of America meant that there was a market in the US for English, German and French books. (...) Victor Hugo became one of the key organizers of an authors' movement for international copyright protection." (p. 33)
- "In the corridors of power that matter to the global economy, the WTO, the International Monetary FUnd (IMF), Washington and Brussels bureaucrats participate in a trade "think speak" in which global monopoly privileges are entirely consistent with free trade and must be strengthened." (p. 37)
- "Corsslicensing, in other words, was really only a game for equals." (p. 45)
- "Attacking patent-based cartels was far harder for a competition authority, for now it had to face the argument that it was interfering in the use of private property." (p. 51)
- "Patent-sharing agreements did exactly the same things that good old-fashioned cartel agreements did. They divided up territories, set prices and controlled production." (p. 53)
- "On July 9 1982 an op-ed piece bearing the title "Stealing From the Mind" was published in the New York Times. Appearing under the name Barry MacTaggart, the then chairman and president of Pfizer International, its central charge was that US knowledge and inventions were being stolen." (p. 60)
- "Absolutely crucial to the persuasive power of this story was economic analysis. The mode of analysis became the message. Economic reports turned the intellectual property story from one of moral transgression into the loss of markets and profits." (p. 64)
- "The 1984 trade amendments had given legal backing to a bilateral process of ratcheting up standards of intellectual property protection in other countries. The process had a chance of success only because other countries wanted to get their hands on the vast US market. As long as these countries calculated that the cost of complying with US demands on intellectual property was outweighed by the benefits of access to the US market then the 301 process would bring positive results." (p. 89)
- Linking intellectual property to trade had been the work of a few key individuals. Pfizer, led by Edmund Pratt, as we saw in Chapter 4, had played a central role in pushing the linkage between intellectual property and trade. Under Pratt's leadership the Adivsory Committee on Trade Negotiations (ACTN) had argued that the US government should develop an integrated multilateral and bilateral intellectual property strategy based on trade linkages. Jacques Gorlin, adviser to ACTN, headed Intellectual Property Committee, the key lobbying body on the industrial side of intellectual property. It had been the Motion Picture Association that "wrote" an amendment to the Caribbean Basin legislation of 1983 that died trade conessions to intellectual property. (...) The reworking of the US Trade Act in the 1980s to accomodate intellectual property was accompanied by the formation of two business organizations, the Intellectual Property Committee (IPC) and the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA).
